Essay --

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the discussion of definite and indefinite descriptions has been at the center of heated debates of analytic philosophy for over a century. There have been many compelling arguments and interesting views by many philosophers on this topic and it is hard to yet conclude whose argument is more correct. In this essay, I will first briefly explain Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions, then present both Strawson’s and Donnellan’s views of descriptions in opposition to Russell’s, then I will conclude the essay by showing why I find the analysis of definite descriptions by Donnellan more persuasive than the others’. To put it simply, Russell believes that the statement, ‘the F is G’ has three components: existence (âˆÆ'xFx), uniqueness (∀x∀y((Fx∠§Fy)→y=x)), and predication (∀x(Fx→Gx)). In other words, for a statement, ‘the F is G,’ to be true, there must exist at least one thing which is F, there must exist at most one thing which is F, and whatever is F must be G. To expand on this, a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ states, ‘There is one and only one F and it is G’ and the difference between ‘The F is G’ and ‘An F is G’ is that the latter is just stating there is a (G) F, whereas the use of the definite article, ‘the,’ emphasizes extra uniqueness. For example, it is true to speak of â€Å"the son of Eric† even when Eric has several sons, but it would be more correct to say â€Å"a son of Eric.† Russell further argues that if there is no unique F, an a ssertion of â€Å"the F is G† is false. Strawson thinks otherwise. Strawson claims that Russell confuses properties of a sentence with properties of a use of that sentence. To explain, while Russell thinks truth-value belongs to sentence meanings... ...rase ‘the F’ to refer to something, thus it does not completely embrace the definite descriptions as actually used in a natural language. For example, when I say, â€Å"the leaves are red,† I am referring to the object, leaves, that I am trying to communicate across, but with Russell’s theory, this may not be the case. Using Strawson’s theory, we must ascertain what object is being identified or referred to and what is being ascribed to it even before we evaluate for truth or falsity. For instance, when I say, â€Å"Smith’s murderer is insane,† and it turns out that Smith was not actually murdered at all, then his theory fails as the description, ‘Smith’s murderer,’ does not apply to anyone. Contrastingly, to me at least, Donnellan’s theory encompasses the weaknesses of the theories by the other two, which is why I believe it is the more persuasive argument over the others’.